

Aviation Safety Program


System-Wide Accident Prevention

Dr. Tina Beard

Investigation Methods and Tools Workshop

NASA Ames Research Center


July 31, 2003




Human Error Role in Aviation Accidents

Aviation Safety Program

SWAP




- Number of hull loss accidents has steadily increased over the past 25 years
- Human factors issues have steadily accounted for ~70% of these accidents
- Introduction of new technological devices or procedures
- Trading one source of human error for another




Problem

Aviation Safety Program

SWAP




- Accidents result from a chain of events
- Many distinct human error related causes of aviation accidents, due to behavior of both air and ground crew
- Degree that each of these precursors contributes to accidents varies over time




Current AvSP Program Organization

Aviation Safety Program

SWAP







Current AvSP Program Organization

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



SWAP Project

Aviation Safety Program

SWAP

- SWAP uses current knowledge about human cognition to develop mitigation strategies to address current trends in accident and incident profiles
- Develop and provide guidelines, recommendations & tools directly to customers through --
 - Better understanding of human error and human reliability associated with tasks
 - Development of interventions and task aids that reduce human error and enhance safety and effectiveness






Active SWAP Customers

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


Continuous involvement of operational partners through all phases

- Identification of human errors
- Definition of HF requirements and risks
- Development of techniques & tools; HF interventions
- Operational validation & implementation

Helps with user acceptance

Establishes a clear transition path to industry implementation



Approach


Aviation Safety Program

SWAP

4. Validate PRODUCTS



Part-task
& Full Mission
Simulations



Computational
Modeling

3. Develop INTERVENTIONS

Accident & Incident Analysis



ASRS

1. Identify SAFETY NEEDS

Aviation
Research


Literature
Reviews



•Consult with subject matter experts



•Scientists are rated pilots




Lab
Studies



Field
Observation
Data




2. Apply METHODS, TOOLS



HPM Products

Aviation Safety Program

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*Human Performance Models
Crew Activity Tracking*

Selected Modeling Frameworks

Characteristics of selected models

- Operator level, cognitively oriented
- Comprehensive, mature and validated systems
- Integrative frameworks facilitating fast-time simulation
- Output is generative, stochastic, context sensitive

Model	Type	Research Team	Demonstrated Sources of Pilot Error
ACT-R/PM	Low-level Cognitive with Statistical Environment Representation	Mike Byrne Rice University Alex Kirlik University of Illinois	* Time pressure * Misplaced expectations * Memory retrieval problems
Air MIDAS	Integrative Multi-component Cognitive	Kevin Corker Brian Gore Eromi Guneratne Amit Jadhav & Savita Verma San Jose State University	* Workload * Memory Interference * Misperception * Multi-crew Communication
A-SA	Component Model of Attention & Situational Awareness	Chris Wickens Jason McCarley Lisa Thomas University of Illinois	* Misplaced attention * Lowered SA
D-OMAR	Integrative Multi-component Cognitive	Stephen Deutsch Richard Pew BBN Technologies	* Communications errors * Interruption & distraction * Misplaced expectation
IMPRINT/ACT-R	Hybrid: Task Network with Low-level Cognitive	Rick Archer Micro Analysis and Design, Inc. Christian Lebiere, Dan Schunk, & Eric Biefeld Carnegie Mellon University	* Time pressure * Perceptual errors * Memory retrieval * Inadequate knowledge


Progressive Implementation Strategy

Advancing cognitive models into increasingly complex real-world applications


**'01 Modeling
Taxi-Navigation Errors**



**'02-'03 Modeling
Nominal Approach/Landing
with and without SVS**



**'03-'05 Modeling
Multiple Off-Nominal
Approach/Landing with and
without SVS**



Taxi Navigation Modeling

Data Set

T-NASA Full Mission Simulation

Modeling Problem


Reproduce/Explain

Taxiway Navigation Errors




Scenario Specifications

- High-fidelity full motion simulation of taxi-to-gate at Chicago-O'Hare
- 54 trials run by 18 airline crews
- 9 different cleared routes -- all in low visibility (1000 RVR)
- Traffic, hold short, and route changes included in scenarios
- 12 off-route errors committed by crews and specified to modelers



Air MIDAS Simulation of Observed Error



Modeling Nominal Approach & Landing

Data Set

Part-task Pilot-in-loop Simulation
Performance data and Eye-tracking (3 Subjects)

Other Information Provided Modelers

Detailed Cognitive Task Analysis

Modeling Problem

Develop "Normative" Model of Approach & Landing with and without Augmented Display




Scenarios

Display Configuration		Baseline	Baseline	SVS
Visibility		VMC	IMC	IMC
	Nominal Approach (nominal landing)	<i>Scenario #1</i>	<i>Scenario #4</i>	<i>Scenario #7</i>
	Late Reassignment (side-step & land)	<i>Scenario #2</i>		<i>Scenario #8</i>
	Missed Approach (go-around)	<i>Scenario #3</i>	<i>Scenario #5</i>	<i>Scenario #9</i>
	Terrain Mismatch (go-around)		<i>Scenario #6</i>	<i>Scenario #10</i>

Crew Activity Tracking System (CATS)

- Computerized engineering model of correct task performance to predict operator activities and interpret operator actions



- Provides context-dependent knowledge about the operator's task that can support tutors, aids, and displays to enhance safety
- Supports visualization and analysis of human-automation interaction

Detecting Errors from Flight Data

Current research demonstrates how CATS can analyze flight data from the Langley B757 ARIES aircraft to detect procedural errors

Callantine (2001a, 2001b)




NASA B757-ARIES



**On-board Data Acquisition System
used to collect flight data**



**Cockpit observations verified
and augmented digital data**



MHF Products

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Maintenance Error Baselines

Inhouse: Crew Factors Group

HF Risk Analysis Tools

University of Idaho

Advanced Displays (VR & AR)


Clemson University

Boeing, Huntington Beach

MRM Skills, Training & Evaluation

Santa Clara University

Naval Postgraduate School & Navy Safety Center



Maintenance Error Baselines

- GOAL: Establish current maintenance error baselines in order to identify safety needs. Re-visit the NASA ASRS database in response to a significant increase in ASRS reporting.

- ~200 reports during 1993-1998
- ~800 reports during 1999-2000

- OBJECTIVES

- Update ASRS incident summaries applying various typologies
 - ❖ MEDA (Boeing): Emphasis on procedural errors (~44%) and related factors (e.g., the document itself, time constraints, insufficient technical support)
 - ❖ HFACS-ME: Focus on context, management, maintainer & workplace conditions

- TOOLS: A standard relational database for future analyses supporting

- multiple coding strategies
- direct links from one set of analyses to another
- data transformations required for text analysis of narratives (QUORUM/PERILOG)

- STUDIES IN PROGRESS

- Analysis of procedural errors
- Shift handover
- MEL document
- MX log
- Time pressure
- Relationship between error types and preconditions


Advanced Displays: Virtual Reality

- ❑ GOAL: Develop technologies that augment traditional OJT and aid tasks through enhanced information support
- ❑ APPROACH: Virtual Reality (VR) simulator for A/C visual inspection training and for controlled studies of human performance
- ❑ PRODUCTS to date
 - VR simulation of aft cargo bay, fuselage, wing with potential defects.
 - 3D eye movement analysis algorithm for collecting eye movement data.
 - Experimental protocol for conducting studies related to the use of feedback and feedforward for inspection training.


- ❑ CURRENT STATUS
 - Tested, verified, and validated performance and process (cognitive measures) data collected by the simulator.
 - Developed GUI for presenting feedforward and feedback data on process and performance measures (output measures).
 - Developed scenarios for conducting studies using data collected from industry partners
- ❑ Partners
 - DAL, Fed Ex, Lockheed Martin Aircraft Centers, NASA KSC
- ❑ NEXT
 - Experiment evaluating various inspection training methods
 - Focus on collaborative OJT




VR Simulation Tools



A 3D display for providing graphical cognitive feedback information



Summary of performance data



Interface provides statistical cognitive feedback information

Performance and Process feedback in the VR environment


Advanced Displays: Augmented Reality

- GOAL: Measurement of process improvement achieved when real-time collaboration is supported by an image-based technology
- APPROACH
 - Definition and selection of an implementation testbed (field site plus engineering site)
 - Implementation of devices and processes for collaboration
 - Measurement of system performance used to gauge the effectiveness of the process improvement to the targeted collaboration.

- PRODUCT Benefits
 - Efficient guidance for uncommon tasks.
 - Complement training / compensate for compressed training schedule.
 - Reduce cost of engineering resolutions.
 - Provide views for areas of limited access.
 - Reduce time away from worksite.
 - Provide access to multiple sources of information.
 - Synergy with multiple contributions to a solution.
 - Markup on imagery may be customized for the technician


Advanced Displays: Augmented Reality: Collaborative Engineering Support Tool

Prospective Environments



Test at this post for current leak.
If ok, attach sensor processor leads
to these 4 small lugs, & and sensor
signal line to +s terminal.


Remote Collaboration and
Annotated Images:
A Problem-Solving System



Instructions via Annotated Video
VCR-like interface for tracking software
(Neumann & Majoros, 1998)

MRM Skills, Training & Evaluation


- GOAL: Recommendations for developing, implementing & measuring the effectiveness of MRM programs
- APPROACH
 - Historical study of industry MRM programs
 - ❖ Jim Taylor, Santa Clara University & Manoj Patankar, St Louis University
 - Case study in applied change
 - ❖ John Schmidt, Navy Safety Center and Bob Figlock, Naval Postgraduate School



Training Products

Aviation Safety Program

SWAP



*Pilot Skill Training for Cockpit Automation
Training Modules and Simulators
Instructor Training & Evaluation*

AvSP Training Element Projects

✈ **NASA Research Announcement Awards:**

- **Veridian Corporation:** Airplane Upset Training Evaluation
- **University of Otago:** Learning from Case Histories in General Aviation
- **San Francisco State University:** Training for Automation Use in Regionals
- **George Mason University:** Abatement of Automation Errors - Cognitive Model
- **University of Illinois:** Transfer of Training Effectiveness of Aviation Training Devices
- **Boeing Corporation:** Analysis of Automation Monitoring Skills

AvSP Training Element Projects, continued

NASA Intramural Research and Collaboration:

- **Glenn Research Center:**

- » Pilot Training Simulator for In-flight Icing Encounters

- **Ames Research Center:**

- » Ab Initio Cockpit Automation Curriculum

- » Development of Cockpit Automation Expertise

- » Gold Standards to Train Instructors to Evaluate Performance

- » Alertness Management Training Module for GA Pilots




- » Pilot Weather-Related Decision-Making

- » Emergency and Abnormal Situations

- » Low-blood Sugar and Aviation Pilot Performance


- » Remembering to Complete Interrupted Tasks

Icing Training **with NASA Glenn**



Development of a Pilot Training Flight Simulator for In-flight Icing Encounters

Development Process of an Icing Effects FTD Concept Demonstrator



Interruption and Distraction Countermeasures

Remembering to Complete Interrupted Tasks



Uncompleted procedures:

- “Probable cause” of several major accidents (e.g., NW255, Detroit, Aug ‘87)
- Show up in ASRS reports every month
- (e.g., failure to set take-off flaps)



Interruptions during flows/checklist a major factor in failure to complete actions (Dismukes et al., 1998)



Interruptions especially frequent during pre-start and taxi (Loukopoulos, et al, 2001, 2003)



Laboratory experiments underway:

- Why are interrupted tasks not resumed?
- What factors influence probability of remembering to complete task?
- What countermeasures would reduce pilots’ vulnerability to interruptions?



Main University Collaborators:

Furman University
University of New Mexico
California Polytechnic State University

Main Industry Collaborators:

Continental Airlines
Southwest Airlines

Automation Training



Low-time, general aviation pilots transitioning to glass cockpit jets ... with no automation training or experience.



Main University Collaborators:


University of California - San Diego
Purdue University
Embry Riddle Aeronautical University

Main Industry Collaborators:

Bel Air Aviation
Sky West
American Flyers

Automation Training

Cockpit Automation Curriculum and Textbook



Teaches fundamentals of cockpit automation use

- Procedures
- Underlying concepts

INSTRUCTIONAL DVD



Aviation Weather Decision Making

THE PROBLEM: Bad weather is a major factor in aviation accidents, especially for Pt. 91 and Pt. 135 operations. Alaska weather and terrain are most extreme in the U.S.

Alaska accidents account for 40% of U.S. total.

BACKGROUND

- Focus on Plan Continuation Errors (continuing with original plan in face of changing conditions).
- NTSB (1994) found that #2 contributing factor to fatal accidents was tactical decision errors, most of which involved PCEs.

RESEARCH ISSUES

WHY do pilots enter or continue in bad weather?

- Inadequate weather information
- Contextual factors: Wx, time and economic pressures
- Pilots' risk attitudes and decision strategies

HOW to improve safety of pilot decision making?



Aviation Weather Decision Making

✈ Research Strategy

- Given that PCEs are associated with aviation accidents, identify patterns of conditions and pilot actions in *incidents* that may be *precursors to accidents*
 - » Identify flight conditions, precipitating events, contextual features, and decisions associated with PCEs
- Compare Pt. 91 with Pt.135 data
- Compare Alaska with continental U.S. data

✈ Data Sources

- ASRS Reports (1994-97) - “*In-flight encounters with weather*”
- Critical decision interviews and surveys AK pilots (n = 52)

Main University Collaborators:

University of Illinois

University of Alaska -
Anchorage

Main Industry Collaborators:

FAA - Capstone Project

NIOSH


Alaska Flight Safety
Foundation

Pilots' Cognitive Performance and Blood Sugar Level

- ☎ Sugar is the fuel of the brain. We must make sure that the pilots' brains have sufficient fuel for the complex cognitive operations they must perform during flight.
- ☎ It is often difficult for flight crews to eat right during normal line operations.
 - Most airlines no longer provide food for their crews.
 - Crews usually depart in the morning before restaurants open; afternoon crews usually return after restaurants close.
 - Duty days can be long, and quick turn-arounds may not allow sufficient time to find food near the gate.
 - Many airport restaurants are located on the other side of security checkpoints
 - Some pilots complain about reduced performance, headaches, or just hunger. But it's possible that most pilots are adversely affected by this practice even if they are not always aware of it.
- ☎ The purpose of this study is to determine whether or not cognitive performance of pilots in routine line operations is affected by the limited availability of food to the flight crew.




The Emergency Situation



Emergency and Abnormal Situations

A Subset of Industry Contacts and Consultants

- Boeing: Dan Boorman, Bill McKenzie, Dr. Curt Graeber
- Airbus Industries: Michel Tremaud, Jean-Jacques Speyer
- BAE Systems: Captain D.J. Gurney
- FAA: Phyllis Kayten, Steve Boyd, Win Karish, Keeton Zachary
- NTSB: Ben Berman, Nora Marshall, Dr. Robert Molloy
- ALPA: Captain Robert Sumwalt
- ATA: Captain Rick Travers
- TSB of Canada: David Curry, Don Enns, Elizabeth McCullough
- ICAO: Captain Dan Maurino
- CAA (UK): Steve Griffin, Captain Stuart Gruber, Dr. Sue Baker
- Airlines: Southwest Airlines, United Air Lines, Continental Airlines, TWA, Fed Ex, Aloha Airlines, Hawaiian Airlines, Air Canada, Cathay Pacific, Airborne Express, Midwest Express




PHF Products


Aviation Safety Program

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Human Factors Tools





PHF Crew Centered Con Ops

Aviation Safety Program

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- Many AvSP technologies impact cockpit.
- The crew position is the unifying viewpoint for the benefit of AvSP Program as a whole.
- Notional description of cockpit equipment and procedures from crew viewpoint that assumes presence of technical products of AvSP
- Other developments that will influence character of cockpit and procedures identified.
- Baseline flight task description completed
- Explicit descriptions and scenario showing future character of cockpit and procedures for AvSP technologies.

https://postdoc.arc.nasa.gov/postdoc/t/folder/main.ehtml?url_id=82510



poc: Dr. Robert Hennessy
Monterey Technologies Inc.

Cockpit Displays Human Factors Website

The website allows the user to:

- View all citations in the bibliography
- Perform simple or advanced searches
- Extract to file or print results
- Submit citations for inclusion
- Contact the curator


<http://avsp.larc.nasa.gov/new.html>



Features:

- Multiple Search Criteria
- Keyword search
- Variety of formats for results
- Tailorable formats
- Built in online help

POC: Dr. Bettina Beard
Bettina.L.Beard@nasa.gov



Alert & Warning Integration


Aviation Safety Program

SWAP



- There is a proliferation of alerting on the flight deck. Current and new systems have separate alerts and notification philosophy for informing the crew.
- The ANCOA (Alerting and Notification of Conditions Outside the Aircraft) program has begun to look at these issues and has demonstrated the integration under a common framework.
- ANCOA provides guidance to how information gets filtered, categorized, prioritized, and represented to the crew.
- Recommend a clear alerting philosophy and notification scheme for the integration information, particularly terrain and weather.
- Generate design specifications
- Implement specifications in software
- Review integrated system with expert pilots

Terrain/Traffic/Wx Integration

Research Findings



Integrated Alerting System prototype indicating overlay of weather, terrain, and traffic on a single display




Data supports the integration of currently disparate systems onto a single display with performance requiring fewer pilot inputs and lower workload scores

POC: Dr. Trish Ververs
trish.ververs@honeywell.com

Tech transfer to industry underway, e.g.:

- Alertness management module for GA posted on Web
- Icing videos, CBT, DVD
- Cockpit automation for general aviation and future airline pilots textbook
- Boeing analysis of automation monitoring skills
- Gold standards to train instructors to evaluate crew performance
- Evaluation of airplane upset training
- Guidelines for the integration of alerts in the cockpit
- MRM tools and guidance
- HFACS-ME data analysis tool for maintenance
- Risk assessment and ROI tools for maintenance



PHF HF Issues Document & Prioritization


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SWAP

Human
Factors
Issues

SvS
Concerns

		Predictor or Velocity Vector	Photorealistic Terrain	Wireframe terrain	Egocentric 3-D View
Workload					
	Mental demand	Ref: 1.2.1.1 Predictor workload not as high as FMA	Ref. 1.1.5.3 terrain provided spatial awareness - 1.1.7.2 Terrain improved SA, not performance - 1.1.8.4 Terrain slope perception - 1.1.5.4 Landing flare strategies	Ref. 1.1.5.3 terrain provided spatial awareness - 1.1.7.2 Terrain improved SA, not performance - 1.1.8.4 Terrain slope perception - 1.1.5.4 Landing flare strategies	Ref: 1.1.1.1 Low cognitive integration - 1.1.8.5 High mental proximity - 1.1.5.4 Flare strategy
	Physical demand	N/A	Ref: Long delays & sickness 1.1.2.2	Ref: 1.1.2.2 Long delays & sickness	Ref: 1.1.1.1 No cost of visual scanning
	Temporal demand	Ref: 1.2.1.1 Predictor workload not as high as FMA	Not tested	Not tested	Ref: 1.1.1.1 Low cognitive integration cost, but keyhole effect - 1.2.3.2 Few visual cues for distance to tunnel - 1.1.5.4 Flare strategy
	Performance	Ref: 1.2.1.1 Predictor not as accurate as FMA - 1.1.5.3 altitude judgement	Ref: 1.1.7.2 Terrain improved SA, not performance - 1.1.5.4 Landing flare - 1.1.5.2 Telepresence and performance - 1.1.5.3 Improved altitude judgements	Ref: 1.1.7.2 Terrain improved SA, not performance - 1.1.5.4 Landing flare - 1.1.5.2 Telepresence and performance - 1.1.5.3 Improved altitude judgements - 1.1.5.4 Perception & Density	Ref: 1.2.1.1 pathway acquisition accuracy - 1.1.1.1 Better orientation than distance judgements
Situation Awareness					
	current situation ownship systems	Not tested	Not tested	Not tested	Ref: 1.2.3.2 Better trend tracking needed
	current situation-geographic				Ref: 1.1.1.1 Depth ambiguity, better orientation judgements - 1.1.5.1 Reduced global SA - 1.2.3.3 Improved SA, representative of terrain outside
	current situation-environmental	Ref: 1.1.6.3 Guidance symbology - 1.2.3.3 SA improved	Ref: 1.2.3.3, 1.2.3.5 Improved SA - 1.1.5.4 Landing flare	Ref: 1.2.3.3, 1.2.3.5 Improved SA - 1.1.5.4 Landing flare	Ref: 1.2.3.2 Task complexity more powerful on ability to focus outside of cockpit than display OS novelty - 1.2.3.3 Relative position SA improved
	current situation-spatial/temporal				Ref: 1.2.3.2, 1.2.3.3 Good spatial awareness, Awareness of secondary info on display questionable, Most wanted 2-D Nav + 3-D tunnel display
	Projection/prediction	Ref: 1.2.3.6 Rejoining pathway - 1.1.6.3 Guidance symbology	Ref: 1.2.3.6 Projection improved - 1.1.7.2 Terrain improved SA, but not performance	Ref: 1.2.3.6 Projection improved - 1.1.7.2 Terrain improved SA, but not performance	Ref: 1.2.3.3, 1.2.3.6 Rejoining pathway
Appropriate Feedback					
	Operating Feedback	Ref: 1.1.6.3 direction indication & preview - 1.2.6.2 current nav error	Ref: 1.1.5.1 Terrain improves global SA - 1.1.5.4 Landing flare strategies	Ref: 1.1.5.1 Terrain improves global SA - 1.1.5.4 Landing flare strategies	Ref: 1.1.1.1 Keyhole effect, visual momentum w/ OTW - 1.1.5.1 Reduced global SA
	Modal Feedback for Operating	Visual	Visual	Visual	Visual
	Failed Mode Feedback	Nothing currently exists	Nothing currently exists	Nothing currently exists	Nothing currently exists
	Alerts				
	number levels of meaning modalities used	Nothing currently exists	Nothing currently exists for a single SVS display	Nothing currently exists for a single SVS display	Nothing currently exists



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	AWARE	GWIS	AWE	ANCOA	Other Studies
	Aviation Weather Analysis and Reporting Enhancements	Graphical Wx Information System	Aviation Wx data visualization Environment	Alerting and Notification of Conditions Outside the Aircraft	
	Ruokangas -NASA& Rockwell Collins	Scanlon -NASA	Spirkovska & Lodha- NASA	Ververs, Dornreich, Good, Rye, Downs, Niehus, & Dewing - Honeywell	
Workload					
Mental Demand		6.5.3 Wx monitoring should be automated, provide indication according to their importance.		6.3.1 Separate display had a higher workload than an integrated display.	6.6.2 status displays may be preferable to command displays as they yield more robust performance benefits and appear less vulnerable to automation biases
		6.5.6. Provide automatic reorientation or interface control to point the aircraft symbol up allowing the pilot to change to a track up position when showing information.		6.5.3 Pilots may not know when/what to request for wx information.	
				6.4.2 Integration display increased time to react than with a separate display.	
Physical Demand		6.6.2 Excessive menu navigation frustrate pilots.			
Temporal Demand					
Performance	Performance increased compared to DUATs	6.5.1 Reduced reliance on ground based wx sources.		6.3.1 Performance increased with a single alert without having to mentally integrate	6.5.1 Not all pilots know the value of getting wx trend information. 6.5.2 Less reliance on automation, with status displays than command displays.
Situation Awareness					
current situation ownship systems		6.5.1 Subject didn't understand location of wx relative to position of aircraft.	6.8.2 Wanted a visual reference of what airport is being reported.		6.8.2 Pilot had trouble identifying location of aircraft without an ownship icon. SA increased with ownship icon
current situation-geographic		6.4.6 Map orientation should be track up configuration otherwise, mental rotation	6.4.2 VFR chart background easily helps identify where they are.		6.4.2 SA increased when spatially related databases on integrated display. 6.5.3 Display should alert pilot that situation has changed.
current situation of weather		6.5.1 Trend information and location of wx increased SA			6.5.1 Provided wx trends to improve SA
current situation n- spatial/temporal					6.4.5 Info on spatial location is more important than severity of hazard.
Projection/ Forecasting			6.5.1 Automatic TAF didn't show forecast for all airports/timeframe only. Selected airport based on arrive time		6.7.1 Lack of SA due to lack of experience and general wx conditions. 6.2 Verbal and written reports of weather conditions are simply not sensitive enough to discriminate between differences that exist across experience levels
Appropriate Feedback					
Operating Feedback			Provides alternative route selection.		
Modal Feedback for Operating	Visual		Visual	6.4.5.2 Time critical - Synthetic voice. Tactical & strategic earcon.	